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Abstract
In this paper, we study the optimal payment system for the pri-
mary health care market when general practitioners are not only
in competition between themselves but also with specialists. We
de…ne the copayment to impose in order to ensure a good alloca-
tion of patients among the two types of physicians. Further, we
set the physician reimbursement system that guarantees an ap-
propriate referral of patients to specialists. We prove that the
GP’s remuneration system is more prospective the larger the com-
petition with specialists. Next, we show that the assumption of
risk-averse patients precludes the optimal payment system from
being a …rst-best solution. To conclude, we contrast the results
of the analysis with systems of gatekeepers where all patients are
required to go to a general practitioner before having access to
specialized medicine.
Keywords : health care - competition - gatekeeping - payment system
JEL Classi…cation : I10, D60
¤The author ows many thanks to Professor M. Marchand for his suggestions and
constant support. I am also especially grateful to Professors Marie-Christine Closon,
Bart Cockx, Ines Macho-Stadler and Erik Schokkaert for their helpful comments.
yAspirant F.N.R.S., Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Université
catholique de Louvain, Place Montesquieu 3, B-1348 Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium.
E-mail : brasseur@ires.ucl.ac.be
11 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to de…ne the optimal payment system for
the primary health care market in a framework where general practi-
tioners (GP) are not only in competition between themselves but also
with specialists. Such a framework can be observed in the absence of a
system of ’gatekeepers’ where patients are forced to go …rst to a general
practitioner before having access to specialized medicine.
It is usually recognized that specialized medicine is more expensive
than general medicine. Yet, very often, we may observe that some pa-
tients systematically choose to go to a specialist, independently of the
degree of severity of their illness. In this respect, it is sometimes sug-
gested that the assignment of a gatekeeper function to general practi-
tioners would contribute to center specialized health care services on
more acute health problems, and so reduce the cost of health care ex-
penditures. An example of application can be found in UK with the
’GP fundholders’ where GPs receive their own budget for purchasing
some hospital and other care services. But arguments against systems
of gatekeeping are still discussed nowadays. A …rst objection concerns
the e¢cacity of these systems in reaching their objective of reducing
health care expenditures. It is argued that in the case of acute illnesses,
a system of gatekeeping would have as sole consequence to multiply the
number of medical visits since every patient would have to go …rst to
a general practitioner before receiving the appropriate services from a
specialist. Second, the GP’s ability to refer his patients to a specialist
when required by their health status becomes crucial in such a system
if it is to guarantee a certain quality level for the health care services
provided.
In the literature, two recent papers deal with questions related to
this problem. Jelovac (1998), who is interested in the role of the general
practitioner as gatekeeper for patients, compares the incentives o¤ered
through the GP reimbursement system when referral is either compul-
sory or facultative. She studies under which conditions it is optimal
to give GPs incentives to refer their patients to a specialist in frame-
works of perfect and imperfect information. This model relies on the
implicit assumption that patients are charged a higher copayment when
visiting a specialist on their own. But it does not try to de…ne the op-
timal copayment to select in view of the patient behaviour. The latter
is taken as given in the model. On the contrary, the paper of Bouck-
2aert (1998) develops a horizontal di¤erentiation model where patients
have to choose to get a treatment from an expert (the specialist) or a
non expert (the general practitioner). The author studies the result-
ing price equilibrium for the two categories of medical treatments. He
shows how the equilibrium solution depends on the degree of di¤erentia-
tion of the two categories of services. In a welfare analysis, he …nds that
too many consumers directly visit the expert if the latter su¤ers from a
cost-disadvantage. But the study abstracts from physicians’ incentives
to provide the appropriate quality of services.
Our analysis di¤ers from these two studies in that it tries to give
appropriate incentives to both the general practitioner and the patient.
More precisely, it looks at the copayment to impose on patients for in-
ducing them to visit a general practitioner (specialist) when they think
they su¤er from a common (special) illness. Similarly, it studies the re-
imbursement system that favours a good referral behaviour for general
practitioners. But contrary to Jelovac (1998), the search for appropriate
incentives for GPs is not justi…ed here on the grounds of any opportunist
behaviour. General practitioners are supposed to provide the most ap-
propriate treatment given the illness severity they diagnose. Instead of
…ghting opportunist behaviours, the incentives given to GPs aim to safe-
guard a certain quality of general medicine. This separates our study
from the literature on experts (besides Jelovac, 1998, see for instance
Wolinsky, 1993) where experts take advantage of having a better infor-
mation to behave in an opportunist way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the features of
the model and provides the regulator’s optimum in the case of full in-
formation, i.e. in the case where everything on the market is under the
regulator’s control. Section 3 develops the second-best solution where
the regulator is constrained by decisions taken by the patients and gen-
eral practitioners. It characterizes the optimal payment system that
results from this situation. After a comparison of the two solutions,
section 4 concludes.
32 The model
A central characteristic of the model comes from the two sorts of com-
petition which general practitioners have to face. First, it is assumed
that at the beginning of the period, before any illness appears, patients
have to register at one GP’s o¢ce. This induces general practitioners to
compete among themselves for attracting a certain number of registered
patients. Second, once registered, patients are supposed to be free to
visit their GP1 or a specialist. General practitioners are aware of this
possibility and so take specialists as competitors.
Let two types of illness be distinguished according to their degree of
severity : high severity illnesses (occuring with a probability ph) and
low severity ones (probability pl). General practitioners and specialists
are supposed to di¤er in their ability to treat high severity illnesses.
We assume that these can only be cured by specialists. Hence, when a
general practitioner diagnoses a high severity illness, he is supposed to
refer his patients to a specialist. Let denote by e the e¤ort provided by
the GP in order to make a good diagnosis. We call D(e) his probability
of diagnosing the correct severity of illness. By assumption, we set
D0(e) > 0. When patients su¤er from a major illness and their GP
diagnoses a minor one, patients are supposed to be referred to a specialist
with a certain delay that implies a disutility for the patient under the
form of a health loss µ.
Patients have identical preferences but di¤er in the value of µ. This el-
ement of di¤erentiation can be given two di¤erent interpretations. First,
the health loss µ could be viewed as µ = kL, with L measuring the ex-
tent of the health loss and k the weight the individual attaches to that
loss. While L could be considered identical for all patients, k could di¤er
across patients depending on their social status or the size of their fam-
ily, for instance. Hence, following this interpretation, µ should be viewed
as a parameter of preferences for patients that is de…ned ex-ante. On
the contrary, a second interpretation would suggest that the health loss
µ is revealed ex-post to patients, after illness has occured. In this case,
all patients should be viewed as identical, with a similar distribution
function F(µ), while the value of the health loss µ should now be consid-
1Physicians of the same type are supposed identical. Hence, patients who decide to
be treated by a GP rather than by a specialist have no interest in asking a treatment
from another GP than the one with whom they are registered. They are therefore
supposed to visit the GP with whom they are registered.
4ered random. The interpretation chosen for our analysis is the …rst one,
but the approach would have been similar had the second interpretation
been preferred.
To formalize this, we develop as in Bouckaert (1998) a simple hor-
izontal di¤erentiation model where patients are distributed on interval
[µ;¹ µ]. The distribution function F(µ) (with 0 · F(µ) · 1) determines
the allocation of patients between the general practitioners and the spe-
cialists present on the market. If we denote by ^ µ the level of µ that
characterizes the patient who is indi¤erent between visiting a specialist
or his GP, F(^ µ) de…nes the proportion of patients asking for a treatment
from their general practitioner rather than from a specialist.
Neither ^ µ nor e are observable or veri…able by the regulator. Hence,
the objective of our study is to evaluate how the regulator can intervene
in the market in order to induce an appropriate distribution of patients
F(^ µ) and GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e. For this purpose, we develop a three-
stage model. In the …rst stage, the regulator de…nes the optimal GP’s
reimbursement system and patient’s insurance plan2 anticipating their
impact on the decision process of general practitioners and patients. In
the second stage, general practitioners decide on their diagnosis e¤ort,
given the payment system in force on the market and taking into ac-
count the competition they play with the other GPs and specialists. In
the third stage, patients decide on the type of physician from whom to
get a treatment anticipating the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort and knowing the
payment system.
To develop this study, we proceed backward and start analyzing the
patient’s decision process. But before this, it is important to note the
role that is assigned to specialists in the model. These physicians only
act through the competition that is supposed between GPs and special-
ists. It implies that we do not try to regulate the specialist’s behaviour,
but rather take it as given. And this is motivated by our wish to focus
on the patient’s and GP’s decision process that are both central in the
discussions on the potential interest of a system of gatekeeping.
2For the rest of the paper, we use the term ’payment system’ to refer to the
combination of GP’s reimbursement system and patient’s insurance plan.
52.1 The patient’s problem
As announced, patients are here supposed to make two decisions. First,
they have to choose, at the beginning of the period, the GP with whom
to register. Second, once they become ill 3, they have to decide on
whether to be treated by their GP or a specialist. The …rst decision
will be formalized when analysing the GP’s problem. In this section, we
focus on the second decision.
To make this second decision, patients compare the utility level they
get when selecting one type of provider instead of the other. We assume
that the patient’s utility function is additively separable in two terms :
health status and income available for the consumption of other goods
than health care. With respect to the health status, we suppose that
once they ask for treatment, patients recover totally unless their general
practitioner does not refer them immediately to a specialist although
they su¤er from a high severity illness. We measure the patient’s health
status in monetary terms and normalize to zero the health status ob-
served after full recovery. Hence, the only term related to health status
that enters the patient’s utility function is the health loss µ that occurs
with a probability ph(1¡D(e)) for patients that select a GP’s treatment.
With regard to available income, we assume that a patient who
chooses to be treated by a specialist rather than by his general prac-
titioner is charged a copayment ±. The copayment for a GP’s treatment
is supposed to be zero, whether the patient is referred or not to a spe-
cialist. In this way, the term ± can be interpreted as a penalty that is
imposed on each patient that prefers to be treated by a specialist. Also
central to the model is the assumption that all patients are risk averse.
This implies that they are all willing to subscribe to an insurance. Sup-
pose a public insurance system. We denote by ¼ the social contribution
imposed to all patients.
Keeping this in mind, we can now express the patients’ utility func-
tion as following. Let denote by UG and US the utility level patients
may expect when being treated by their GP or a specialist, respectively.
They can be expressed as
3For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all patients become ill during the
period. The only uncertainty concerns the degree of severity of the illness. But this
assumption does not alter our results.
6UG = u(w ¡ ¼) ¡ ph(1 ¡ D(e)) µ (1)
US = u(w ¡ ¼ ¡ ±)
where w indicates the patient’s gross income and function u(:) satis…es
the property of u0(:) > 0 and u00(:) < 0 to re‡ect risk aversion. Note that
the expression of UG supposes that patients are able to observe the GP’s
probability of diagnosis error (1¡D(e)). This ability could be explained
by some phenomenon of reputation. Thanks to reputation, patients are
able to evaluate the e¤ort level of each general practitioner. We assume
here that this reputation phenomenon is su¢ciently strong for general
practitioners to be committed to supply the e¤ort level that is expected
given their reputation.
This allows us to de…ne the patient who is indi¤erent between visiting
his GP or a specialist through the threshold value ^ µ that equals UG and
US and depends upon ¼, ± and e :
^ µ =
u(w ¡ ¼) ¡ u(w ¡ ¼ ¡ ±)
ph(1 ¡ D(e))
(2)
Clearly, ^ µ gives the value of µ beyond which all patients prefer to go to
a specialist rather than to their GP. From expression (2), it is straight-






















where subscripts G and S refer to patients selecting a GP or a specialist,
respectively, and the probability ph is exogenous.
By de…nition, risk aversion implies u0
S > u0
G if ± > 0. Hence, expres-
sions (3) indicate that the threshold value ^ µ increases with the insur-
ance premium ¼ as with the patient’s copayment ± and the GP’s e¤ort
e. The …rst positive relation results so directly from the assumption
of risk aversion. An increase in the insurance premium ¼ reduces the
utility of available income u(:). Because of risk aversion, this utility re-
duction is higher, in marginal terms, for a patient who is treated by a
specialist rather than by a general practitioner. As a consequence, more
7patients are induced to prefer their GP to a specialist. This corresponds
to a higher threshold value ^ µ. The interpretation of the second positive
result is straightforward. The higher the …nancial penalty imposed on
patients selecting a treatment from a specialist, the higher the number
of individuals choosing to be treated by their general practitioner rather
than by a specialist, and so the larger the value of ^ µ. As to the last result,
this can be given the following intuitive interpretation. The higher the
GP’s e¤ort, the better the quality of his diagnosis and, so, the lower the
risk of a health loss for a patient selecting a GP’s treatment. Again, this
induces additional patients to choose to be treated by their GP rather
than by a specialist. And this is illustrated through a higher threshold
value ^ µ. Note again that this relation supposes that patients are able to
observe the GP’s probability of diagnosis error. As underlined above,
this may be interpreted in view of some reputation.
2.2 The physician’s problem
The general practitioner’s problem consists in choosing the diagnosis ef-
fort e that maximizes his utility function. In the previous section, we
have seen how the GP’s e¤ort level in‡uences the patient’s decision on
selecting a treatment from his GP or a specialist. We now suppose that
the GP decides on the value of e while anticipating this in‡uence. In
other words, the GP makes his decision taking account of the competi-
tion he plays with specialists.
But general practitioners are also supposed to be in competition be-
tween themselves for the registration of patients. Assume that all GPs
are identical. In a context of perfect information, this implies that pa-
tients are equally distributed among general practitioners. Let N be the
number of patients registered at each GP’s o¢ce. This number is con-
sidered as …xed by the general practitioner. The next section explicitly
shows how N is determined by competition.
Subject to these two sources of competition, the general practitioner
selects the e¤ort level that maximizes his utility function. The GP’s
utility function is supposed to be made of two components : the util-
ity from his revenue and the disutility associated with his e¤ort. The
size of both terms depends on the number of services provided. We
normalize to one the number of health care services provided for each
patient treated by the general practitioner. Given that competition with
specialists implies that only a proportion F(^ µ) of the N registered pa-
8tients is actually treated by their GP, the total number of treatments
supplied by a general practitioner sums up to NF(^ µ). In return for his
services, the general practitioner receives a mixed reimbursement. We
assume here that his revenue combines a per unit payment ® for each
health care service provided with a salary ¾ that remunerates him for
his participation on the market. Hence, the GP’s utility function can be
de…ned as
V = ¾ + NF(^ µ)® ¡ v(NF(^ µ)e) (4)
where the disutility function is increasing and convex (v0(:) > 0;v00(:) >
0). The general practitioner’s problem reduces so to
max
e V = ¾ +NF(^ µ(¼;±;e))® ¡ v(NF(^ µ(¼;±;e))e) (5)
with N and ^ µ(¼;±;e) resulting from the competition with the other GPs
and specialists, respectively.
Note that this problem illustrates a characteristic we underlined in
the introduction. No opportunist behaviour is considered here for the
general practitioner with respect to the treatment provided. His only
decision consists in choosing a diagnosis e¤ort. The treatment o¤ered
by the GP follows then directly from his diagnosis. When the general
practitioner diagnoses a high severity illness, he is supposed to refer his
patient to a specialist whereas he provides him with a given treatment
when he suspects a low severity illness. By determining so the degree
of quality of general medicine, the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort in‡uences the
allocation of patients among general practitioners and specialists. Ex-
pression (5) explicitly shows that in selecting his e¤ort level, the GP
trades o¤ the increased disutility and the larger workload, and so rev-
enue, that both result from a higher diagnosis e¤ort. Note that no
altruistic concern a¤ects the GP’s decision.
>From the GP’s optimisation problem, we obtain the following …rst-
order condition
Ve = ¡NF(^ µ)v0(:) + f(^ µ)
@^ µ
@e
N(® ¡ ev0(:)) = 0 (6)
and if we di¤erentiate Ve, we may express the GP’s e¤ort as
e = e(®;¼;±;N) (7)
Note that the salary ¾ does not in‡uence the GP’s choice of e¤ort. The
exact role of this …nancial instrument will become clearer in the next
section.
9Under the assumption that the second-order condition of the GP’s







This means that the GP’s remuneration ® gives him …nancial incentives
to increase his diagnosis e¤ort. On the contrary, the e¤ect of competition
between general practitioners acts in the opposite direction. This last
result looks intuitive. The higher the number of patients registered at
the GP’s o¢ce, the lower the incentives for the general practitioner to
produce a high diagnosis e¤ort in order to treat a large proportion of
registered patients. The sign of the partial derivative of the GP’s e¤ort
e with respect to the insurance premium ¼ and the copayment ± is
less obvious since it depends on the form of the distribution function










Given that from (3),
@^ µ=@±
@^ µ=@¼ is positive, it implies that the partial deriva-
tives of e with respect to ± and ¼ have the same sign. Expression (9) will
be used later on in the paper. Note that intuitively, this expression can
be explained by relation (6) that shows how the insurance premium ¼
and copayment ± a¤ect the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e through their impact
on the patient’s threshold value of µ.
In section 2.1., we have seen that the patient’s choice of ^ µ is contingent
upon the insurance premium ¼ and the copayment ± in force on the
market as well as on the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e. We have just seen how
that this e¤ort depends itself on the payment system (¾;®;¼;±) and on
the number of registered patients N that results from the competition
played between general practitioners. In the next section, we analyze
how the regulator decides on the payment system while anticipating its
in‡uence on the patient and GP decision process.
102.3 The regulator’s problem
As suggested in the introduction, the concern of the regulator is here
twofold. He wishes …rst to control the number of patients having a di-
rect access to specialized medicine. Second, he wants to guarantee a
good referral behaviour of general practitioners through their diagno-
sis e¤ort. In formal terms, the regulator’s objective is to in‡uence the
patients’ threshold value ^ µ and the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort level e in or-
der to maximize the patients’ utility function. In this section, we will
look at the problem in the …rst-best situation where the regulator can
directly decide on the threshold value ^ µ and on the GP’s e¤ort level e.
The development of the second-best solution, where the regulator can
only indirectly act on the patient’s and GP’s decision process through
the choice of a particular payment system, will then follow in the next
section. But before developing these solutions, we start to present the
two constraints that the regulator has to face in his decision process.
2.3.1 The physician participation constraint
In solving his problem, the regulator must make sure, …rst, that his
decision induces GPs to participate. In other words, the GP’s utility
level that results from the regulator’s decision may not be lower than
what general practitioners would get if choosing another occupation.
Denoting by ¹ V this participation level, and recalling the GP’s utility
function given in (4), the GP participation constraint can be expressed
as
V ´ ¾ + NF(^ µ)® ¡v(NF(^ µ)e) ¸ ¹ V (10)
This constraint can be interpreted in view of the competition that
is assumed to prevail between general practitioners. Suppose a …xed
population of patients of size P on the primary health care market.
This population has to be divided among the GPs such that for each
general practitioner, the N registered patients are su¢cient for their
participation constraint to be satis…ed. This condition determines the
number M of general practitioners operating on the primary health care
market. To see this, note that the GP’s utility function V increases
with N as, from (6), ® ¡ ev0(:) > 0. This utility increase induces more
physicians to be willing to participate on the market and so M increases
also. Equilibrium on the primary health care market is reached when
N = P=M. Hence, both N and M are determined by the physician
11participation constraint (10). It can be shown that this constraint is
satis…ed with equality.
As to the specialists, given that we do not try to regulate them,
these are supposed to be willing to participate whatever the number of
patients that select their practice.
2.3.2 The budget constraint
The assumption we make with regard to the regulator’s budget con-
straint is rather usual. It consists in de…ning a fair insurance premium
¼ that fully compensates for the total cost of general and specialized
medicine that is supported by the regulator.
To express this constraint formally, we de…ne …rst the cost of medical
treatments. Note that the medical treatments that are here considered
can go beyond the services o¤ered within the physician o¢ce. Nursing,
technical sta¤, equipments, for instance, are all elements that can be
included in the treatment cost. We denote by cl and ch the unit cost of a
treatment ordered by general practitioners and specialists, respectively.
Di¤erences in cost between the two categories of health care services
could be imputed to di¤erences in the technology used, for example. We
suppose here that GPs (specialists) supply health care services that are
based on a low (high) technology. This re‡ects the idea that contrary
to specialists, general practitioners are supposed to be able to cure only
minor illnesses. To justify the interest of a regulation on the allocation
of patients, we assume a cost-disadvantage of specialized medicine with
ch > cl.
We know that the medical treatments provided by a general prac-
titioner can include referrals to a specialist. Hence, the total cost of a
GP’s medical treatment depends on the severity of the patient’s illness
and on the GP’s diagnosis. Recalling that ph (pl) indicates the probabil-
ity of su¤ering from a major (minor) illness and that D(e) measures the
probability for the general practitioner to diagnose correctly the illness
severity, the total cost of a medical treatment provided by a GP can be
expressed as
CG(e) = ph[D(e)ch + (1 ¡ D(e))(ch + cl)] (11)
+ pl[D(e)cl + (1 ¡D(e))ch]
Clearly, when a major illness is diagnosed, the patient is treated by a
specialist, whatever the true intensity of his illness. Hence, the cost of
12the treatment o¤ered to the patient amounts to ch. When the general
practitioner correctly diagnoses a minor illness, the cost reduces to cl.
But if the patient su¤ers from a major illness and this is diagnosed as
minor, the patient has to face two treatments. After having provided his
services, the GP is supposed to recognise his error and refer …nally his
patients to a specialist. Hence, in this case, the total cost of treatment
amounts to cl + ch. For patients selecting directly a specalist, the total
technical cost of a treatment simply sums up to
CS = ch (12)
The costs CG(e) and CS do not yet totally de…ne the cost supported
by the regulator. Besides these technical costs, the regulator still has to
support the payment provided to the physicians in return for their ser-
vices. For the general practitioner, we have seen that the reimbursement
amounts to ¾ + NF(^ µ)®. It is then straightforward to deduce the re-
imbursement due to each individual patient. Concerning the specialist,
since we are not interested in regulating him, we suppose his payment
to be included in the unit amount ch. Further, the regulator can deduct
from all these costs the patient’s …nancial participation. We know that
a patient who selects a specialist is imposed a copayment ±. In all other
cases, the copayment is equal to zero.
To sum up, the budget constraint implies that the insurance premium
paid by every patient has to satisfy
¼ = F(^ µ)[CG(e) + ® +
¾
F(^ µ)N
] + (1 ¡ F(^ µ))[CS ¡ ±] (13)
with CG(e) and CS de…ned in (11) and (12), respectively. Having de…ned
the two constraints, we can now express the regulator’s optimisation
problem in the …rst-best situation.
2.3.3 The …rst-best solution
In the …rst best, the regulator chooses the payment system (¾;¼), the
allocation of patients (N;^ µ) and the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e that, under
constraints (10) and (13), maximize the patients’ utility functions. Note
that in the …rst best, everything is under the regulator’s control. There-
fore, the …nancial instruments ± and ® that aim at giving appropriate
incentives to patients and GPs are not introduced here.
13Recalling the utility functions of patients selecting a GP or a spe-








+ ¸[¼ ¡ F(µ¤)(CG(e) + ¾=(F(µ¤)N)) ¡ (1 ¡ F(µ¤))CS] (14)
+ °[¾ ¡ v(NF(µ¤)e) ¡ ¹ V ]
where ¸ and ° are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
and physician participation constraint, respectively, and the threshold
value ^ µ is here denoted by µ¤ to stress that it is chosen by the regulator
rather than by patients. The …rst-order conditions of this optimisation
problem are given by
-¾ ´ ¡¸=N + ° = 0
-¼ ´ ¡u0 + ¸ = 0















+ v0(:)] = 0
-¸ ´ ¼ ¡ F(µ¤)[CG(e) +¾=(F(µ¤)N)] ¡ (1 ¡ F(µ¤))CS = 0
-° ´ ¾ ¡ v(NF(µ¤)e) ¡ ¹ V = 0
These expressions are rather standard. For each parameter, the opti-
mum is such that the marginal bene…t that would result from a change
in the value of the parameter is equivalent to the marginal cost that this
change would also imply. So, for instance, looking back at the …rst-order
condition related to N, the …rst term at the right-hand side can be inter-
preted as the gain that results from an increase in N. This gain consists
in a decrease in the per-registered patient cost of a medical treatment
provided by a GP. Similarly, the second term at the right-hand side
measures the loss, in terms of an increased disutility for the general
practitioner, that results from an increase in N. Clearly, the …rst-order
condition on the optimal number of registered patients trades o¤ the gain
¸¾=N2 against the loss °F(µ¤)ev0(:). The …rst-order condition related
to the physician’s diagnosis e¤ort e can be given a similar interpretation.
The gain induced by an increased e¤ort e is here expressed through the
14reduced health loss (phD0
e
R µ¤
µ µdF(µ)) while the cost now combines an
increased social cost (¸F(µ¤)dCG
de ) with a larger disutility for the GP
(°NF(µ¤)v0(:)). Also particularly interesting is the …rst-order condition
related to µ¤. This allows to state the next proposition.
Proposition 1 In the …rst best, the optimal allocation of patients among
the general practitioners and the specialists present on the primary health








Proof : The proof follows directly from the …rst-order condition related
to µ¤ where, from -¼ = 0, ¸ is substituted by u0 and where ev0(:) =
¾
F(µ¤)N from -N = -¾ = 0.
This proposition can be intuitively interpreted. The threshold value
µ¤, and so the optimal proportion of patients selecting a GP, increases
with the patient’s marginal utility u0(:) and with the cost-disadvantage
of specialized medicine (CS ¡CG(e)¡ ¾
F(µ¤)N)4. The …rst result is linked
to risk aversion whereas the latter justi…es the interest for a regulation
on the allocation of patients when specialized services are found more
expensive than general medicine. But both relations are tempered by
the probability ph(1¡D(e)) for a health loss to occur when the patients
treated by their GP are not immediately referred to a specialist although
their illness requires it. Given that the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e determines
his referral behaviour, and so the quality of general medicine, this result
con…rms the expectation that a regulation favouring …rst visits to GPs
can be suggested only if we have some guarantee on the quality of general
medicine.
Proposition 1 together with the other …rst-order conditions related to
the …rst-best solution are taken as the benchmark to which the second-
best solution can be compared. This solution is developed in the next
section.
4Recall that the specialist’s remuneration is supposed to be included in the treat-
ment cost CS.
153 The optimal payment system
In a second-best situation, the regulator cannot observe and verify the
patient’s health loss µ and the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e. The equilibrium
values of ^ µ and e that are observed in the primary health care market
result from decisions taken by the patient and the general practitioner.
But from (3) and (7), we know that these decisions depend on the pay-
ment system in force on the market. In our model, the payment system
combines the mixed GP’s reimbursement system de…ned through (¾;®)
with the patient’s insurance premium ¼ and copayment ±. Hence, we in-
vestigate now how the regulator de…nes both systems while anticipating
their in‡uence on the patient’s and GP’s decision process.
The regulator’s objective function and the constraints are equivalent
to what was stated in the …rst best. Only the instruments di¤er. It is








+ (1 ¡ F(^ µ))u(w ¡ ¼ ¡ ±) (15)
+ ¸[¼ ¡ F(^ µ)(CG(e) + ® + ¾=(F(^ µ)N)) ¡ (1 ¡ F(^ µ))(CS ¡ ±)]
+ °[¾ + NF(^ µ)® ¡ v(NF(^ µ)e) ¡ ¹ V ]
with ^ µ = ^ µ(¼;±;e) and
e = e(®;¼;±;N)
where the two last expressions result from the patient’s and GP’s prob-
lems, respectively. Note that as in the …rst best, the regulator decides
here on the number of registered patients at each GP’s o¢ce. From the
GP’s participation constraint developed in section 2.3, we know the the
value of N determines the number of physicians M operating in the pri-
mary health care market. Assuming that the regulator can choose the
value of N amounts to supposing that he can decide on the number of
general practitioners in practice.
The objective function - is the same as in the …rst best. We denote
by W the regulator’s objective function - that includes the relations
de…ning ^ µ and e. Taking into account this notation, we can derive from
(15) the following …rst-order conditions for the optimum :
16W¾ ´ -¾ = ¡¸=N + ° = 0


































W¸ ´ -¸ = ¼ ¡ F(^ µ)(CG(e) + ® + ¾=(F(^ µ)N) ¡ (1 ¡ F(^ µ))(CS ¡ ±) = 0
W° ´ -° = ¾ + NF(^ µ)® ¡ v(NF(^ µ)e) ¡ ¹ V = 0
where -¾ and -e, evaluated here at the second-best equilibrium, are ex-
pressions similar to these appearing in the …rst-best problem and where
-N = ¸¾=N2 + °F(^ µ)(® ¡ ev0)
-^ µ = ¡¸f(^ µ)[CG(e) + ® ¡ (CS ¡ ±)] + °Nf(^ µ)(® ¡ ev0)
-¼ = ¡[F(^ µ)u0
G + (1 ¡ F(^ µ))u0
S] +¸
-± = (1 ¡ F(^ µ))(¸ ¡ u0
S)
>From the …rst-order condition (FOC) related to ¾, it is straightfor-
ward to verify that the …rst term on the right-hand side of W® = 0 is
equal to zero. Recalling that @e
@® 6= 0, it is then easy to check that the
FOC for the optimal value of ® can be met if and only if




>From the other …rst-order conditions, this implies in turn that
-N = 0 (17)








The next propositions all follow from these expressions. The …rst two
propositions determine the optimal payment system at the second best
while Proposition 4 characterizes the resulting GP’s diagnosis e¤ort and
patients’ allocation.
17Proposition 2 In the second best, where patients select one type of
physician and where GPs decide on their diagnosis e¤ort, the optimal















+ [(CS ¡ ±) ¡ CG(e)]
¾ = ¡NF(^ µ)(® ¡ ev0)
Proof : It can be shown that the …rst part of Proposition 2 follows
from (16) while the optimal level of salary ¾ is directly determined by
-N = 0.
Note furthermore that from the physician’s problem (6),







Hence, substituting this relation into the de…nition of ¾ given in Propo-
sition 2, we …nd that at the second-best optimum, the physician’s salary
satis…es







This last expression and Proposition 2 prove the role of competition on
the de…nition of the optimal GP’s remuneration system. Recall that
this role can be measured through the derivative @^ µ
@e. Clearly, the larger
the competition, the higher this derivative and therefore the smaller
the fee-for-service ® and the larger the salary ¾. This suggests that
the optimal GP’s remuneration system is more prospective the larger
the competition with specialists. Hence, this result would con…rm the
idea that competition may reduce the need for regulation, with this one
taking here the form of …nancial incentives.
At the second-best solution, the optimal prospective payment ¾ takes
a negative value. As to the optimal fee-for-service reimbursement ®,
Proposition 2 shows that it is function of the following factors. If it
decreases with the e¤ects of competition (see the above argument),





and with the cost-di¤erence observed between specialized and general
medicine. The …rst positive factor indicates the marginal bene…t for the
18patient of an increase in the physician’s e¤ort, taking into account the
e¤ects it implies in terms of the cost of general medicine and neglecting
its consequences with regard to the physician’s utility level. Clearly,
when these marginal bene…ts increase, the regulator is more interested
in inducing the physician to produce a higher diagnosis e¤ort. Similarly,
when the cost-disadvantage of specialized medicine becomes relatively
higher, the regulator wants to increase the physician’s e¤ort since, as
a result of competition, this contributes to increase the proportion of
patients selecting a general practitioner rather than a specialist. And
from the physician’s problem, the regulator knows that such a higher
e¤ort can be induced through the adoption of a higher fee-for-service
since @e
@® > 0.
Having characterized the optimal GP’s reimbursement system, we
can now look at the patient’s copayment that satis…es the second-best
optimum.
Proposition 3 In the second best, the optimal patient’s copayment ± is
de…ned by














Proof : This de…nition results directly from the …rst-order conditions




¡ W± = 0






G + F(^ µ)u0
S
(20)
It remains then to substitute (20) into (18) to demonstrate Proposition
3.
Following Proposition 3, three elements a¤ect the value of the opti-
mal patient’s copayment ± : the relative cost-disadvantage of specialized
medicine (…rst term at the right-hand side of Proposition 3), the GP’s
19diagnosis e¤ort e and the inequalities in marginal utility (u0
S ¡u0
G) that
are observed between the patients who choose to be treated by a general
practitioner or a specialist. The regulator, who maximizes the patients’
utility, does not wish to impose too large inequalities between the pa-
tients who visit a general practitioner or a specialist. This induces him
to adopt a smaller value ^ µ. On the contrary, the value of the patient’s
copayment ± increases with the …rst two factors. Clearly, the relatively
more expensive the specialized medicine and the better the GP’s di-
agnosis e¤ort (and so the quality of general medicine), the more the
regulator is interested in inducing patients to visit …rst a GP rather
than a specialist. And from (3), the regulator knows that an increase in
the copayment ± provides such incentives.
Finally, note that from (3), Proposition 3 allows us to state that,
as the optimal patient’s copayment ±, the optimal number of patients
that select a treatment from general practitioners increases with the
cost-disadvantage of specialized medicine and the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort
e while decreasing with the inequalities in marginal utility (u0
S ¡ u0
G).
Comparing this with Proposition 1, we may observe that the …rst two
factors determine the optimal allocation of patients both in the …rst
and second best. What mainly di¤erentiates the two solutions is the
additional in‡uence of inequalities in marginal utilities that is reported
in the second best. The next proposition compares further the …rst- and
second-best solutions.
Proposition 4 The second-best optimum is characterized by a too small
number of patients selecting a GP’s treatment and by a too high GP’s
diagnosis e¤ort.
Proof : Proposition 4 follows from expression (16). To see this, recall
the value of ¸ given in (20). It is then straightforward to verify that
-¼ < 0 (21)
Further, it can be shown that risk aversion implies ¸ < u0
S. Conse-
quently,
-± < 0 (22)
>From (18) and (19), expressions (21) and (22) imply that
-^ µ > 0 (23)
20and from (16),
-e < 0 (24)
Expressions (23) and (24) demonstrate Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 proves that the regulator’s choice of the optimal pay-
ment system at the second best does not allow to attain the …rst-best
solution in terms of the patients’ allocation and the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort.
Expressions (23) and (24) show that the size of the insurance premium ¼
and copayment ± is larger than what would be observed if their impact
on µ was not considered. In fact, expressions (18) and (19) show that
these higher values compensate for a smaller threshold value ^ µ and so for
a too high number of patients choosing to be treated by a specialist. It
is to counteract this inappropriate allocation of patients that higher co-
payment and insurance premium are adopted by the regulator. >From
(3), it is expected that these higher levels will induce more patients to
prefer to be treated by their GP rather than by a specialist. The larger
diagnosis e¤ort e supplied by the general practitioner can be given a
similar interpretation. To compensate for a too small ^ µ, the regulator
adopts a reimbursement system for the GP that gives him incentives to
supply a higher diagnosis e¤ort. By increasing the quality of the GP’s
referral behaviour, it is expected that a larger number of patients will
choose general medicine rather than specialized services. Hence, to sum
up, if starting from the second best, we were able to directly control the
patient allocation ^ µ and the GP e¤ort e, it would be optimal to increase
^ µ and, simultaneously, reduce the GP’s diagnosis e¤ort e.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the optimal payment system to impose
on the primary health care market when competition prevails between
general practitioners and specialists. To formalize such a framework, we
have de…ned a three-stage model. In section 2.1, we have developed a
horizontal di¤erentiation model to investigate the patient’s selection of
one category of physicians. In section 2.2, we have evaluated the di-
agnosis e¤ort chosen by the general practitioner when the latter takes
into account the competition played with the other GPs and specialists.
Finally, in section 3, we have examined how the regulator de…nes the pa-
tient copayment and the physician reimbursement system that guarantee
21a good allocation of patients among the di¤erent types of physicians as
well as an appropriate referral of patients to specialists.
The analysis proves that at the second-best solution, the GP’s re-
muneration system is more prospective, the larger the competition with
specialists. Next, it shows that the optimal value of fee-for-service in-
creases with the marginal bene…ts patients get from a larger GP’s di-
agnosis e¤ort and with the cost-disadvantage of specialized medicine.
Since the latter calls for more patients visiting a general practitioner
rather than a specialist, and given that, from competition, this can re-
sult from a higher GP’s diagnosis e¤ort, both factors make the regulator
more interested in inducing general practitioners to produce a higher
diagnosis e¤ort. And from the physician’s problem, he knows that a
higher fee-for-service reimbursement o¤ers such an inducement.
Concerning the second-best optimal value of GP’s diagnosis e¤ort
and patients’ allocation, we …nd that the inequalities in marginal utility
that are observed between the patients who visit a general practitioner
and those who select a specialist preclude the optimal payment system
to achieve the …rst-best solution. But our study also con…rms the result
of Bouckaert (1998) and Jelovac (1998) that it is not always optimal for
the regulator to give …nancial incentives to restrict the use of specialized
medicine. We …nd, indeed, that the optimal patient’s copayment, and so
the optimal patients’ allocation among the two categories of physicians,
does not only depend on these inequalities in marginal utility but also
on the cost di¤erence reported between the two types of health care
services. Next, we prove that the quality of the GP’s referral behaviour
is also crucial for evaluating the interest of controlling the access to
specialized medicine.
In terms of policy implications, these results invite us to reconsider
systems of gatekeepers where all patients are required to go to a general
practitioner before having access to specialized medicine. They show
that a less rigid system may be preferred in certain circumstances. Im-
portant factors are, notably, the cost di¤erence between the two types of
health care services and the GP’s referral behaviour. Our analysis con-
…rms that an alternative policy to compulsory gatekeeping could consist
in adopting …nancial incentives. These might contribute to improve the
allocation of patients on the primary health care market. Moreover, our
analysis allows to assess the incentive power that can be assigned to the
GP’s reimbursement system and the competition in force on the market.
In order to re…ne these …rst results, it might be interesting to bring
22some extensions to our analysis. First, we could introduce elements
of imperfect information. If asymmetric information was supposed be-
tween patients and general practitioners, the impact of competition on
the market equilibrium might di¤er. This might now be a¤ected by rep-
utation concerns and by the patient’s search for adequate treatments.
Examples of theoretical studies devoted to this subject are notably the
papers of Rochaix (1989) and Wolinsky (1993). Second, the GP’s prob-
lem might be extended to a second decision variable. The general prac-
titioner might not only have to decide on his diagnosis e¤ort but also
on the treatment supplied. Such an extension could provide a potential
source of opportunist behaviour for the general practitioner.
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